the overall costs that makes it increasingly more competitive. I am confident that that will be the case in the future.

We have also been a leader on another very significant biofuel in the form of biodiesel; what people do not really realize about our President is that he has taken some bold moves for the environment. This being one.

Another very bold move that he did was to significantly reduce the amount of sulfur in diesel, about a 95 percent reduction in the sulfur in diesel and by taking sulfur out of diesel, you significantly reduce its lubricity. One of the ways to increase lubricity and put that back in is through biodiesel.

We have had a very active discussion in Minnesota on trying to be a forward State on biodiesel as well, and I am hopeful that discussion continues on. I think we can do the same things with biodiesel that we have done with ethanol.

Finally, I just want to go back to one very simple example about how good this is for your environment. As I go around into our ethanol plants, I have oftentimes challenged those that make MTBE, that I will drink some ethanol if you will drink some MTBE. MTBE would be very harmful for, other than given that it is basically 100 percent alcohol, you can drink our good ethanol.

Mr. Speaker, I have been trying to come up with something, because our former Senator Rudy Boshwitz had his milk stand at the Minnesota State Fair where he had flavored milk, strawberry milk and blueberry milk, and trying to come up with something else.

So we toyed for a very short period of time having a taste test like the Pepsi-Coke test, where you would come out to the farm feast, you come out to the State Fair, and you could taste your ethanol versus your biodiesel.

Given that we probably would be killing some and making the rest intoxicated, we gave up on that idea very quickly, but it just really highlights the fact that this is something that is going to be good for the environment.

It is not going to have any side effects. It is the type of thing that we ought to be promoting, and it is the type of thing that we ought to be applauding the administration as we are here today for making the decision that we did.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. I agree. I think every American. This is not just about rural America. I think if every American would think through the arguments about this, I would think every American would thank the President today. He did the right thing. He did the right thing for the environment.

As was said earlier, this is not a choice between clean air and clean water. He made the right choice for the environment. He made the right choice in terms of energy independence and he made the right choice in terms of rural America and helping us find new markets for things that we can grow and produce in abundance here in the United States.

I would like to paraphrase President John Kennedy, he said, you know, we all inhabit this same small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future.

And if I might parenthetically add, we are all environmentalists. We all want to leave this country and this world a better place. Ethanol is a big part of the solution. I know sometimes the critics, they say, well, yeah, they get the subsidy. We are sending these checks out to farmers for ethanol.

We need to explain this. What happens is we give the blenders of ethanol. It actually goes to the refiners we give them a tax credit. If they will use this product, which we know is better for the environment, both the air and the water, we said a number of years ago, we will give you a small credit.

And the interesting thing is that our farmers and the people who produce ethanol have found ways to produce it so much more efficiently today, that when corn is less than $2 a bushel and oil is over $25 a barrel, it is actually cheaper to put the ethanol in the gasoline.

As a matter of fact, last year when we had this big debate in the United States, because the price of gasoline, particularly in the Chicago market, went up to over $2.20 for a gallon of gasoline, a lot of people were saying it is ethanol. Ethanol is the problem.

But at that time, the rack price of ethanol delivered from Minnesota to Chicago was about $1.10 a gallon. The rack price of the gasoline that was being blended with was over $1.20 a gallon. In fact, it was something like $1.40 to $1.50. That is what the cost was at the refinery.

I find it hard to believe that people would argue that somehow blending a 10 percent blend of a product that costs $1.10 a gallon with a 90 percent blend that costs $1.30 or $1.40 or $1.50 a gallon, how in the world the price of ethanol is driving the price of gasoline?

The fact of the matter is that the price of ethanol was keeping the price of gasoline lower. It is better for the environment. It is better for the consumer. It is better for the energy dependence.

The President did exactly the right thing today, and I think he understood what President Kennedy meant when he said that we all inhabit the same small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future, and ethanol and biofuels are going to be an important part of our energy future.

Our time is almost expired, and I want to thank all of my colleagues, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SHIMKUS), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. JOHNSON), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. OSBORNE), as well the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BEREUTER), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LATHAM).

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank our new freshman colleague, the gentleman from the State of Minnesota (Mr. KENNEDY). I think this has been an important special order.

This is a very important day. And again as I started this special order, and the words of the old spiritual, oh, happy day. This is a happy day for America. It is a happy day for America's farmers. It is a happy day for American consumers, and whether they realize it today or not, this is a happy day for all of the people in the State of California.

Because they are going to begin to phase out that cancer-causing product which is leaching into their groundwater even as we speak called MTBE, and we are going to begin to replace that with a wholesome product that can be grown right here in the United States called ethanol.

As my colleague from Minnesota pointed out, ethanol is the kind of a product, it is so pure and so clean, and I would not say good for you necessarily, but it will do no more than inebriate you. It will not kill you. We are going to replace that cancer-causing MTBE with ethanol.

So the President has done us all an enormous favor today. This is an important decision. I applaud the administration for making it. I think it is going to open new avenues for all of us. And, again, I thank my colleagues for joining us tonight.

ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GRUCCI). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I join a number of my colleagues here this evening to discuss the administration's policy on national missile defense.

I put up on the board here one of the comics that was recently in a newspaper showing Secretary Powell with members of NATO and essentially asking Secretary Powell if they really expect him to buy that, and that is, of course, a used car which stands symbolically, in this instance, for the national missile defense program being discussed and being put forth by this administration at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues to discuss that policy and specifically the administration's apparent attempt to move swiftly to deploy that system even before tests show that it is feasible.

□ 2100

There are apparent plans to proceed beyond research and development, though no proper consideration has been given to many critical factors. We have yet to really assess all threats against the United States, whether they be from another state or a nonstate.

The alleged purpose of this limited national missile defense or the early stages of the Bush administration plan is supposedly to protect us against rogue nations or against accidental or

unintended launches. Rogue nation threats are primarily the national missile defense concern, or so we are told. If that is the case, we should assess them and assess them on whether or not that threat of missiles from rogue nations compares to other threats that exist to our Nation.

Currently, the threat of weapons of mass destruction from missiles ranks low on the list of CIA possible threats. While some rogue nations have crude missile systems nearing the capability of reaching the continental United States, they are, according to the CIA and others, less credible threats than other forms of aggression and terrorism. In keeping with that train of thought, we should establish most likely threats and key our defenses towards those that are most likely.

With limited funding resources, the United States must be sure that our spending is proportionate to our established priorities. Spending on any national missile defense must not adversely affect readiness or military personnel quality of life or modernization of conventional land, air and naval forces, nor should it adversely affect research and development efforts aimed at necessary leap-ahead technologies. It cannot ignore the benefits of timely and reliable intelligence or diplomacy.

In view of all our national priorities, whether they be domestic in nature or international and defense prospects that affect our national security, the cost that is going to be incurred must be warranted by the security benefits we should expect to gain.

Americans deserve to know before we deploy the realistic cost estimates and who will pay. Is it only the United States that is going to fit the bill, or will all nations that stand to benefit from any deployed national missile defense system participate in sharing the cost? So far, the projections show the following costs.

Mr. Speaker, I have another chart. Mr. Speaker, as the chart indicates, the initial estimates for 20 interceptors were originally estimated to be at a cost of nine to $11 billion. The fact of the matter was that that was in January of 1999 at $10.6 billion. By November of that year, it was at $28.7 billion. By February of 2000, it had moved up to 100 interceptors being planned, and the estimate then was $26.6 billion. By April, it rose to $29.5 billion; by May to $36.2 billion; by August of 2000, $40.3 billion by the own estimate of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Now in August of 2000, the CAIG report estimates it up to about $43.2 billion. That is with a number of items not included.

As my colleagues can see on the chart, other estimates in testing adjustments, alternative booster programs add another $4.5 billion, bringing it up to some $47.7 billion. Not included also is the restructuring of the program to remedy testing delays. That adds another $2.8 billion. Essentially, we are up to $50.5 billion on this program and going up, up and forever upward.

We should not forget the fact that this administration is not only talking about a land-based limited system. It is talking about adding a second phase and a third phase to the land-based design, adding a sea-based provision, adding an air-based aspect, and then going on to space-based laser.

So let us add those up. Adding phases 2 and 3 of a ground-based system would add another $50 billion. The sea-based system would be another $53.5 billion. An air-based system would add another $11 billion. The space-based laser, besides inviting in the number of people to secure items in space which we alone have almost monopoly on, would add a cost to seventy to $80 billion. So total estimates on this program are at a minimum of $80 billion to $100 billion or as high as a trillion dollars, depending on how far out we go.

That should all bring us to the issue of feasibility. The administration now intends to use this system whether or not it works. In other words, it is going to buy it before it flies it.

We have had a number of experiences in our military programs with that, most recently with the F–22 and with the Osprey. The Osprey not only costs us a lot of money to go back and cure remedies that were not caught because we did not test it properly, it has cost us the lives of 25 Marines.

In keeping with this administration's ready, shoot and then aim prospect, Secretary Rumsfeld has taken an in-your-face attitude to our allies as well as to our friends as well as to Russia and China. He is determined to put all other considerations aside and deploy this system even if the technology is not available and is not proven feasible.

Astoundingly, the Washington Post reported these comments from an administration official, and I quote: ''It is a simple question. Is something better than nothing?'' It went on to say, ''The President and the Secretary of Defense have made it pretty clear that they believe some missile defense in the near term is, in fact, better than nothing.''

Now my colleagues may join me in being astounded in that, but that statement should at least rest on two underlying assumptions. One would be that that something in fact works, and this does not; and, two, that deployment will not subject the country to even greater security dangers. This program will.

What the Pentagon and the Department of Defense and the Secretary and the President know but do not apparently want the Americans to discover or consider or debate is that the National Missile Defense System's effectiveness has not yet been proven even in the most elementary sense.

Also, there should be grave concerns regarding the disturbing side effects of the National Missile Defense System, such as uncontrollable launches and their attendant risk to world security.

A study has been completed, not by groups opposed to missile defense, but by the department's own internal experts. That study makes it clear that potentially profound problems exist with the National Missile Defense System. The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, known by its initials OT&E, is an independent assessment office within the Department of Defense. It was created to oversee testing programs and in particular to ensure that weapons development programs are adequately tested in realistic operating conditions.

Its former director, Mr. Philip Coyle testified on September 8 of last year before the Subcommitte on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform. He testified about a report that he had compiled during the deployment readiness review that was conducted in the summer of 2000.

As a result of that testimony, it became apparent that the Pentagon was overstating the technological progress and potential of this National Missile Defense System.

Because I thought it was imperative that the public have full access to Mr. Coyle's study, I asked Mr. Coyle to provide the full report for the record of that committee, and he agreed to my request. My motion that the subcommittee include that study on the public record for the September 8, 2000 hearing was accepted without objection. At no time did Mr. Coyle or Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, the Director of the Missile Program, express any reservations.

Well, after 8 months and at least six separate requests and a subpoena threat, the subcommittee finally obtained the study. But the Department of Defense asked that that study be kept confidential. I think this is precisely the wrong response.

The Bush administration is proposing to our allies and strategic partners that deployment be speeded up even beyond optimistic evaluations. In this context, the need for public debate about the system's capabilities and its potential dangers if deployed prematurely is urgently needed.

I have, therefore, written to Secretary Rumsfeld for a full explanation of the Department of Defense request to hush up this report. I have asked the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. SHAYS), the subcommittee chairman, to schedule hearings on this study and its implications as expeditiously as possible. In conversations earlier this evening with the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. SHAYS), I have been informed that those hearings will be pursued.

Now, Mr. Coyle raises fundamental problems with the national missile defense testing programs. He tells us it is far behind schedule, and it is slipping further. The test program is severely deficient, failing to test basic elements of the system. In fact, after numerous

failures, Mr. Coyle tells us that the Pentagon actually altered the test program to make it easier, and still it continued to fail.

Mr. Coyle described the immature status of the program. There are limitations in flight testing and inadequacy of available simulations. Therefore, a rigorous assessment of potential system performance cannot be made. That is, no one can reliably predict that the National Missile Defense System, as planned by this administration, will perform at the required levels.

Testimony of the Director found several ways the system may not work: its inability to defend against decoys. As discussed extensively in open literature, the enemy could employ various types of countermeasures and overwhelm this function.

I hope that our speakers this evening will talk at length at that. I know the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HOLT) is here. He has particular expertise in this area, and we should discuss it at length.

But rather than address the fatal errors, the omission of tests with countermeasures could make the system unable to fulfill its core function of defending against accidental or intended launches; and rather than discuss that, the Pentagon is hitting them by dumbing down the testing requirements.

The Department of Defense also provides interceptors with key discrimination information ahead of time. In other words, it rigs the game. It tells them trajectory. It tells them timing. It tells them height. It tells them all sorts of information. Yet, the system will not have that benefit if and when it is deployed.

So there is a need for rehearsed engagements without advanced knowledge, yet none have been done so far and none are planned to be done.

The director criticizes the software user simulations as it suffers from an unfounded reliance on unrealistic and overly optimistic parameters. There is no plan to consider conducting flight tests with multiple targets or interceptors even though multiple engagements could be expected to be the norm. These are potential security risks of premature deployment.

Phantom tracks. The system automatically allocates interceptors against phantom objects. In other words, these are created when the radar coverage transfers from one radar system to a second radar system, and the system mistakenly interprets the new radar rhythms as originating from a second reentry vehicle.

The operators, the manual operators were unable to deal with that. There is one very serious immediate danger if the United States launches multiple interceptors against missiles that do not exist. Adversaries may interpret these launches as a hostile first strike and respond accordingly.

So it brings us back to this idea that we are going to deploy this system before we have adequately tested it, before we have talked about the cost of this program, before we have talked about our priorities in defense and whether or not this is, in fact, the most serious issue we ought to be confronting at such an enormous cost while it is still very far from being feasible.

Deployment has been defined to mean the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition, timing, trajectory or direction and when operated by military personnel at all times of the day and night in all weather.

In almost every one of those categories, there have been tests that have been failed or tests that are not even planned to determine whether or not this system can work.

Yet, we have a Secretary and apparently an entire administration that is willing to walk that plank and commit billions and billions of dollars on a system that has not been proven to work, casting aside all of our other defense needs, casting aside the questions that it brings to our national security, and casting aside the issues of others priorities within this country.

We have a report that seriously calls into question the readiness of this national missile defense. I think that report leads to serious questions of this administration's ill-advised plan to deploy before it has proven technologically feasible and apparently with total disregard for costs, stability in this country and the world, and effect on other priorities.

This is no time for the Department of Defense to bury a study. It is time for full disclosure, for deliberation and for debate.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HOLT) and cede the floor to him.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts, and I commend him for setting aside some time this evening to talk about it because every one of us in this room has an obligation to talk about this important issue. Polling data shows that the public does not feel well informed about what could be the most expensive defense ever deployed and one that has serious flaws.

The President is trying to sell his magical mystery shield to the allies today. As the gentleman's cartoon shows, it is a used car with no guarantee. The problem with the missile defense, quite simply, is it would be costly to deploy, easily circumvented, and it would be strategically destabilizing. In other words, it would actually detract from our national and international security.

One does not need to read a lot of history to be reminded of the—Maginot line, the so-called impenetrable wall that has become the symbol of misguided defense policy. The proposed missile defense shield probably would not work as designed and wishing will not overcome the physics. It could be confused with decoys as the gentleman from Massachusetts mentioned a moment ago.

I am a physicist by background, but one does not need advanced physics to understand that a Nation that would be capable of building an intercontinental ballistic missile, that could deliver a weapon of mass destruction could also deploy decoys by the hundreds, by the thousands.

In the vacuum of space, a balloon travels just as well as a rocket. Without the resistance of air, it is easy to inflate a balloon.

□ 2115

You could inflate dozens or hundreds of balloons. One of them might contain a warhead, others would look identical. They could all travel at thousands of miles per hour, many thousands of miles per hour, miles per second.

I have spent some time looking at the physics of the detection systems, and I am convinced that it would be very difficult to determine the decoys from the actual warheads. But putting that aside, a Maginot-type missile defense system, designed to defend an entire continent, or as the President has suggested defend all nations from weapons coming from any nation, well, it could be bypassed with suitcase bombs or pickup trucks or fishing trawlers or sea-launched missiles, and so it would be billions of dollars down the drain.

But the real tragedy is it would not be just a diversion of precious resources that we would not have available for health care, for smaller class sizes, for modern school facilities, for securing open space, for taking care of America's veterans, for all of those things that make America worth defending. No, it would be worse than a waste of money, because simple strategic analysis will tell us that provocative, yet permeable, systems are destabilizing and they lead to reduced security.

Think of it this way: we say we are building a defensive system. Some potential enemy says, well, you are going to prepare an offensive strike, and then you will use your defensive system to prevent us from retaliating. And we say, no, no, no, it is only a defensive system. And they say, sure, we believe you. Well, if they believed us, they would not be our enemy. In fact, this is a weapon system in search of a cooperative enemy, an enemy that would not try to spoof us with decoys, an enemy that would not wonder what is going on behind that shield.

We have all read stories of the knights of yore. When knights carried shields, they did not carry the shields around the house; they used those shields in battle, to thrust and parry from behind the shield. That is why, as counterintuitive as it may seem, a defensive system becomes a destabilizing

offensive threat. So this would undo decades of arms control.

And, in fact, the President has said he would use such a missile defense to go beyond the anti-ballistic missile treaty; in other words, to abrogate the treaty, to break the treaty, to throw it away. This system, or any imaginable system, is not going to be a substitute for cooperative arms control. This is not something where technology will overcome cooperation. You do not need to be a rocket scientist to understand that technology will not solve this fundamental problem.

In fact, the President has said that whereas some years ago President Reagan presented his program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, as something to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, President Bush says he understands that will not happen. So that even with an international missile defense such as he is proposing, it would still be necessary to maintain the option of massive retaliation; in other words, mutual assured destruction. Well, this is not a technological solution to our strategic predicament. This is not an answer to weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has not been able to develop a workable missile defense system after 40 years of trying. We have had the Nike Zeus, the Sentinel, the Safeguard, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and actually there was SDI-I, which was a space-based laser, or directed energy system, known as Star Wars colloquially, and then there was Strategic Defense Initiative II, which was kinetic kill vehicles, or Brilliant Pebbles, and there was G-PALS and National Missile Defense; and now President Bush has extended this to international missile defense. Well, after all of these years of trying and tens of billions of dollars spent, we are still nowhere close.

My colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY), referred to the study that the Pentagon had undertaken of the system. And essentially they said that not only have there been no successful intercepts, but that simulations that would give confidence that this would work do not exist, and that the current state of test facilities is immature. We are not close to deployment.

And maybe we can take some solace in the fact that we are not close to deployment, because once this is deployed, it will set off a series of dominoes of the arms race around the world where countries that might feel threatened by it, say China, would increase their arsenals and in turn threaten other countries, say India, who in turn might build up their arsenals and threaten other countries, say Pakistan. Now, that is certainly not our intention. This is purely defensive. But that is the way it would work, and it will not get us out of our nuclear predicament.

Again, I thank my colleague from Massachusetts for setting aside this time. We have an important and difficult job to do over the coming weeks to make sure everyone in the country understands the choice that is before us here.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. ALLEN).

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY) for holding this event tonight to talk about national missile defense and the Bush administration's enthusiasm for an untested and uncertain project.

The reason I think it is so important to have this conversation tonight is that it is very clear to me that this is one of the most critical issues facing this Congress and one in which the public obviously needs more information. And whatever the right answer is, we have to have this kind of discussion and debate. We are not going to get it during the regular legislative day, so we need to get it after hours.

In many respects, all of us believe that if we had a national missile defense system that actually worked and did not threaten our security, that would be a good thing to have. The difficulties are several: first of all, we have now spent tens of billions of dollars on the system to date, and we are a long way from having a system that is actually tested and that works. There are scientists across this country who are convinced that this system can never work. It is also clear that to build a system on the scale that the Bush administration envisions is a hundred billion dollars and up. A huge amount of money.

Third, there is a problem. We need defenses that are proportional to the threat. And it is not at all clear that a threat of a ballistic missile attack by North Korea, by Iran, or some other rogue state is really at the top of the list of the threats that we face. Many of us in this room today joined with other concerned citizens who came to Washington with a simple message for President Bush, and for all of us as policymakers. First, the President's fast-track missile defense will make the world less stable, not more stable. Second, rushing deployment of missile defense will provoke other nations to increase their offensive arms and undermine U.S. national security.

In particular, it is very likely to encourage the Chinese to develop more ICBMs, which in turn will make India uncertain and insecure, which will add to a race in missile development in India and in Pakistan.

Third, abandoning arms control agreements and gambling on unproven missile defense technologies is unsafe and unwise. When we look back through the centuries, military history has really been a battle between the sword and the shield. Building a better shield has always compelled the forging of a better sword. The Bush administration needs to explain why it thinks this missile shield is exempt from the laws of history.

As I said before, missile defense might be justified if it could be proven to work reliably and consistently and if we were confident that it would improve our overall national security. But President Bush has not provided any particulars about his proposal. It is only a multilayered proposal which will protect us against all kinds of threats.

Congress and the American people really have to force this administration to answer the hard questions that they have so far avoided. For example: one, can missile defense technology be proven to work reliably and consistently? To date, the answer is no.

Second, what is the cost? To date, the answer is, who knows, but perhaps tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars.

Third, will national missile defense improve other overall national security? Well, not if we abandon the ABM Treaty and abandon an arms control regime that has kept the peace for 50-odd years.

Fourth, is national missile defense a proportional response to a credible threat?

I serve on the House Committee on Armed Services, which evaluates threats to our security. The U.S. intelligence community recently issued a report on global threats and challenges we may face by 2015. This is shown on the chart beside me here, ''Threats and Challenges in 2015, a National Intelligence Council Report.'' There are many diverse threats here. Some of them relate to population trends, aging patterns, migration, health and AIDS. Others relate to natural resources and the environment, access to food or to clean water, the availability of energy, or environmental degradation. Some are related to science and technology, the global economy, or to national and international governance.

There are some threats that do relate to future conflicts, and a national missile defense system protects against one of those threats, that is, a weapon of mass destruction delivered by means of a long-range missile. It does not protect against a Ryder truck or a boat or a suitcase that can be carried into a building or near a building and blown up.

If we look at what happened tragically in Oklahoma City, or if we look at what happened to the U.S.S. Cole, I submit that is the future. Those are the risks that we in this country really have to worry about far more than having some country decide they are going to fire a missile at our country, which would be tracked from the moment it left the ground in North Korea or Iran or somewhere else.

Over the last 55 years, deterrence has worked and it continues to work. Just take one example. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use his chemical and biological weapons. Why? Because the first Bush administration made it clear that if he did that there would be massive retaliation. Even

Saddam Hussein, in the middle of a conflict, respected the power of retaliation of this country.

My concern is if we put all our money into missile defense, there is no way that we are not going to underfund these other threats to us with the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by other means.

□ 2130

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield. The gentleman served on the Committee on National Security, and I know he must have heard many demands to see that our men and women in arms are justly paid, to see that they have the facilities that they need, that all of the branches of the armed services have the equipment and the support that they need.

I listened recently to the former chair of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Sam Nunn, who noted that we risk the possibility of having vital resources that we need for other aspects of the military all sucked up into this one plan that does not work.

I have been surprised as I have traveled around my district in Texas at how many people who are coming up and expressing opposition to this plan who are veterans who have served and who recognize how foolhardy it is to divert all our resources into one area, and that area being one that is not proven to work.

I am wondering if the gentleman is hearing from other people who are in our military services informally or have served in the military who recognize the danger that has been spotlighted tonight and that former Senator Nunn has voiced publicly?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield. The gentleman from Texas is exactly right. In my home State of Maine, we have Bath Ironworks where half of the destroyers for the Navy are built. There is no question in my mind or the minds of many people in Maine, those who served in the military and those who did not, if you spend tens of billions of dollars more on a national missile defense system, it will simply sit there. And we will not have the kind of Navy we need to protect our interests around the globe. The same argument can be made with respect to procurement for tactical aircraft. Clearly it can be made with respect to the pay and benefits for the men and women in our armed services.

Mr. Speaker, what we have to remember about a national missile defense system is that it protects against one single threat and is useful for no other purpose. It would not be effective against Russia or China. It would only be effective against a state like North Korea or Iran. When you look at those states, North Korea is willing to sit down and negotiate away their missile defense program. Iran just elected a reformist president with 75 percent of the vote. We can deal with these countries and negotiate with these countries. Believe me, it is a lot less expensive to do that, negotiate away the threat than it is to build this kind of system.

But the gentleman is absolutely right, you stay within the defense budget and before we get to education and health care and the environment, this kind of system will drain money away from other urgent national priorities.

If I may add one more thing, it is important to note that Secretary Rumsfeld recently said that he thought there should be deployed the rudiments of a missile defense system by 2004, even before the testing is complete. As one of our colleagues mentioned today, that date is significant. The point is, try to get something in the ground before the next election, before the President comes up for reelection. That is no way to run this kind of defense procurement effort and weapons system.

Mr. Speaker, if we know anything about weapons systems for the Department of Defense, we should fly before we buy, we need to test before we purchase. It is particularly true of the most complex system on the drawing board at the Pentagon. This system is being rushed in a way that is destructive not only to our military, but to our national security. And we need the public to understand this is not a simple issue, but a great deal is at stake.

Mr. Speaker, I want to say personally to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY), I appreciate very much his holding this event tonight and yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. Even if we were to assume on our wildest dreams, because that is essentially what it would be, North Korea, one of the poorest nations in the world, that cannot even feed its own people, would wake up some morning and would have the vision that it wanted to commit mass suicide, and assuming it is several years in the future and they had somehow developed a nuclear missile with the capacity to even reach our coast with any sort of precision at all, it would be much more likely they would put a biological or chemical weapon on it, in which case they would use multiple warheads. In that case, it would overwhelm any limited national missile defense system we would have.

We are having to project forward and do a system that is much larger, and get into hundreds of billions of dollars and a prospect that is unrealistic.

The second issue is the issue of confidence. Ostensibly we are doing this to have some sort of strategic advantage over some rogue nation holding us hostage with the prospect that they might send off a weapon of mass destruction by missile. The fact of the matter is that there is speculation that we may not be able to come close to 100 percent effectiveness.

Twenty or so years ago when they were talking about President Reagan's Star Wars, one of the groups that was advocating against it used to come out with an umbrella with holes in it and say that is the kind of protection you are getting. It is essentially the same situation here. The probability that you would be able to get 100 percent of any weapon sent over in most estimations of any reasonable scientist is nonexisting. So you would have no confidence that it was 100 percent reliable, and I would suggest that leaves you with no ability to effect a strategic decision. It is not a useful prospect to have if it worked on its best abilities on any given day because even its best abilities are not projected at 100 percent.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR).

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the hardworking and able gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY) for sponsoring this special order this evening, and it is a pleasure to join the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HOLT) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KIND) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT) in this important discussion.

Today in Madrid, a reporter asked President Bush how he could reconcile his opposition to the Kyoto Treaty, an opposition that he says is based upon a lack of scientific evidence, with his support for Star Wars which is also not supported by scientific evidence.

''How do we know it is going to work?'' President Bush stated. ''Well, we have to spend the dollars on research and development.'' But I am sure President Bush is aware, he is not proposing only research and development. The Bush Star Wars proposal involves deployment of the system, not just research and development. Indeed, this shocking lack of scientific evidence is the Achilles' heel of the administration's single-minded pursuit of this system.

As others have mentioned, a Star Wars program will cost our people over $50 billion or more and still counting, and that is only the first phase.

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DOGGETT. I know one of the areas that the gentlewoman has considerable expertise in is in reference to agriculture and her work for farmers across the country. It has been suggested by some administration officials that we apply an agricultural approach to this. We take this $100 billion, and it does not make any difference if it works because it can be a giant scarecrow and it will scare off the people from around the world. I am wondering from your expertise in agriculture if you think that using Star Wars as a scarecrow might be sufficient to protect our families?

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman raises a very good point. I do not think scarecrows work.

Our experience over a decade ago with the MX missile proposal, and to

have been a party to those debates to a system that first was proposed to be stationary, and then when they realized that is a sitting duck, maybe it was a scarecrow, I do not know, they said maybe we should put it on a train on a track and move it around. We eventually were able to defeat that and say that the real strength lay in our triad, and the fact that we had a mobile Navy, we had a mobile Air Force and the best trained Army in the entire world.

We have to do better, but it does not make any sense to be throwing billions of dollars away on an unknown system; and, quite frankly, enraging our European allies and other allies around the world and ratcheting up the arms race without consultation by this ill-advised proposal. We know that the scientific evidence is not there, and we always have been pushing for what kind of system are we talking about. What is this thing going to do?

Here in Congress we are often given the argument we cannot solve a problem simply by throwing money at it, whether it is agriculture, child poverty, prescription drugs, we cannot just throw money at these problems. But with Star Wars, it seems to be different. Just throw enough money at it, and we will be lucky if something works in the end. Do not test the system against the full range of countermeasures and do not develop a fully integrated prototype before protection, and do not require an adequate testing program. Just spend $50 billion.

Mr. Speaker, we do not have that luxury because we have a $5 trillion debt overhang in this economy, and we are dealing with precious taxpayer dollars. Others have talked about health care and education and the environment and prescription drugs for our senior citizens, money to update our food safety systems, all of the money to strengthen Medicaid and Medicare.

Mr. Speaker, if we go around and look at the real strength of this country in our Armed Forces, it is those who choose to serve America, dedicated young men and women living in some of the worst housing conditions anywhere in the world, including right here in the Nation's Capital. If we are going to have the best armed men and women systems in the world, my goodness, should we not be paying attention to those already serving.

Mr. Speaker, why are our adjutants general from around the country complaining about too many missions with not enough money? We have to take care of what we are asked to do today, not throw away money on deployment of a system that nobody ever fully understood.

I had military retirees come up to me and say, ''Why did we have to take cuts in benefits? Why are people who served our country put in a different position in terms of retirement than those who have served on the civilian side?

The budget that the administration has produced will not meet all of the health care needs that our veterans have across this country. We have them classified, A, B, C, D. Everybody is on a different platform in terms of veterans' health services. We have 25.6 million veterans in this country. We have to pass a good budget to serve them, and we have to do what is right and put America's priorities in order.

Truly, this Star Wars proposal is a misplaced priority.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for allowing me to share in this special order.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for joining us tonight. I have a quote here on the board. It is a quote that the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made on May 29. He was referring to a comment made by President Bush. He stated, ''We ought to engage our brains before we engage our pocketbooks.'' What sharp contrast that statement is to the administration's apparent focus now on starting a system that they admit has not been shown to have been tested thoroughly and that has not been shown to work. We are making an exception for national missile defense, and hundreds of billions of dollars. We are not going to engage our brains, we are going to engage our pocketbooks and start down a path that creates all sorts of mishaps and mischievous.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KIND).

Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I commend him for the leadership he has shown in raising the education level in this body and hopefully throughout the country in regards to the importance of this debate, and a thorough study and analysis of the various proposals that we are hearing coming out of the Bush administration.

I am glad we have with us as a colleague in this Chamber our own solar physicist, a former employee at the Nuclear Fusion Laboratory at Princeton, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HOLT), because what we are talking about is rocket science, and it is nice to have his perspective in regard to the technological capability that we currently possess on such an important but expensive program.

Mr. Speaker, it is hard to engage in a thorough analysis or conversation or review of what the Bush administration is talking about in regards to a missile defense system because I am not sure they know what this system is going to look like ultimately. How do you get into the details of a policy proposal when the details are lacking?

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Mr. TIERNEY. I would just point out this next quote up here, the gentleman has exactly hit on the point. On June 7, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, at a press conference, people were asking him, ''Does it even work?''

His answer was, ''This is an interesting question in the sense of what do you mean when you say that works?''

You look at that on its face value as what is he talking about? We know when it works. That is why we do studies. That is why Mr. Coyle did his study, that in case it does not work. Not only does it not work, it needs considerably more testing until it gets to a point we are comfortable that it works reasonably well or sufficiently, and they do not even plan to do the tests so far on that.

But again they want to engage our pocketbooks before we engage our national brain on this and start building and committing us down that path. I would just make that point.

Mr. KIND. I thank the gentleman for making that point. It is an important point. It is a little bit frustrating as we are trying to get more information from the administration to find out exactly what their vision is in regards to missile defense: Is it going to just be land-based or sea-based, air-based? Is it going to involve a space-based type of missile defense system? Is it going to be a limited defense system? Is it going to be a national missile defense system or a universal application which we will share with our allies or any country in the globe who wants it? Because what kind of moral position would we be taking if we do in fact develop the technical means to deploy a system such as this but not offer it to other nations around the globe when an intentional or an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon could result in tens of thousands or millions of casualties in a particular country?

This is what we need to keep asking the administration about. I for one am not sure if it is the right moral position to just come out and oppose any type of system at all. There is a lot of discussion about a rogue madman launching a nuclear missile at the United States, but there is also the possibility of these missiles falling into the wrong hands, a possible terrorist gaining control of some launch capability in Russia, for instance, I think is a real possibility, or even an accidental launch and what kind of position would we be in then if we were not at least going forward on the research and development and exploring the feasibility of this type of system at some point in the future.

But for me at least fundamentally there are three overriding questions that I am waiting to get answers for. Firstly, will it work? Do we have the technological capability of pulling it off? Secondly, how much is it going to cost the American taxpayers to deploy such a system? And, thirdly, even if we do find something that works and we can deploy it, is it going to make the United States more or less secure in the final analysis?

Mr. DOGGETT. I know the gentleman from Wisconsin is well known in this body as a hawk of sorts, a deficit hawk. He is always up there on the top in the ratings of the Concord Coalition on fiscal responsibility. We have got a budget. This plan that they are

not sure what they are going to do and when they are going to do it, has there been any provision made for that in this budget or in future budgets to tell the American people what this questionable project will cost and how we are going to pay for it?

Mr. KIND. It is a great question. No. One of the more frustrating aspects of the budget resolution debate that we had earlier this year, the context of the tax cut debate that we had earlier this year was that there was in fact no provision, no asked-for appropriation for the ongoing deployment of a missile defense system within the administration. All this has got to add up. It should add up within the context of a balanced budget, one that does not jeopardize the fiscal solvency of the current generation or future generations. That again is more information which is lacking from the administration. Cost estimates that I am hearing from some of the engineers, some of the experts who would be in charge of deploying such a system, range anywhere from $100 billion to $200 billion over a 10-year period.

I just had a conversation with former Senator Sam Nunn this afternoon. He said that whatever figure you get, you might as well double or triple that amount because it is going to be inherently difficult to do this in a fiscally responsible manner without the defense contractors opening up and the subcontractors wanting their piece of the deployment pie. But even more fundamentally, we have had test after test after test in trying to hit a bullet with a bullet, that is, the missile defense test. Each time it has failed. Obviously we do not today have the current technological capability to pull it off. I think that is one of the misunderstandings that the general American public might have. They see that we have gone to the Moon, they see all this great technological development around us and how it is transforming our lives and many of them may just assume that we have the technological smarts to do this, to knock the bullet out of the air with another bullet when in fact when all the preconditions and the inputted variables are in the test to begin with, the tests are still failing. That is a fundamental issue that we need to keep asking ourselves, is should we first have the technological means to do it before we deploy or just move forward with deployment regardless of the cost and regardless of the effectiveness of the system?

Mr. TIERNEY. I think there is an obvious answer to that. For this country to move forward and commit billions of dollars on a system that is not known to work, has not been tested, and when Mr. Coyle, the reporter of which I spoke earlier, specifically says the tests are inadequate and unrealistic and they do not even plan to do tests that would be adequate and realistic as this moves forward is a frightening prospect. I think if we were to be able to have that report instead of the Department of Defense trying to hide it and trying to keep it hushed up, if we were to have the Secretary come in and explain to us why an unclassified report is being kept from the American public or at least attempted to be kept from the American public, we would be able to debate the context of that report which specifically says not only are there tests that are unreasonable, that they had very few countermeasures in those tests, and then when they decided that they at one point were not being very successful, they dummied the tests down and they had even fewer.

At one point there were plans for nine or 10 or more countermeasures to come in and then they dummied it down to just two items up there and then one of them was easily distinguishable from the other and they gave all of the coordinates and other information ahead of time and still missed. We are not going to have that luxury of any system that is expected to work, we are not going to get advance notice of where it is going, what the trajectory is and all the other information.

So I think that that question answers itself, that we would be foolish as a Nation to spend the kind of money that we are talking about just for the limited land-based system. And this is testimony I referred to earlier in front of our Committee on Government Reform, the Subcommittee on National Security, where they were already up over $50 billion for a program that started at 9 to $11 billion, and that is only at that stage. Add on phases 2 and 3, you are over $100 billion. Add on the sea-based, add on the air-based, add on the space-based that they are talking about, you could be anywhere between $300 billion and $1 trillion. I think if we start down that path with no expectation that it is going to add to our national security, the answer is pretty clear, I think, that we are being pretty irresponsible as a government.

Mr. KIND. I think as far as the two initial questions that I have, there are some huge question marks in regards to how expensive this is going to be, whether or not we can in fact deploy a system that is going to work but, finally, is this going to make us more or less secure in the final analysis? My friend from Massachusetts recognized that a lot of the experts working on this system are hoping for maybe an 80 percent effectiveness rate. Well, 80 percent quite frankly does not cut it. If you have got multiple missiles being launched at us, what city are we going to sacrifice? Is that going to be acceptable? I do not think it gives us much more flexibility in foreign policy negotiations with rogue nations if we just have an 80 percent effective system. But perhaps more importantly is what is going to be the response of Russia and China to even a limited missile defense shield? Is this going to encourage increased nuclear proliferation within their country? Because generally the response from countries that feel threatened from such a system is to ramp up their production of more nuclear weapons so they can overwhelm our system. It is not just China we are talking about. This has profound ramifications with India and Pakistani nuclear policy, perhaps one of the most dangerous areas of nuclear proliferation on the globe right now. We need to ask ourselves what will be the response of these other nations. Even though the Bush administration is claiming that such a shield is not meant to better Russia or China but rather the rogue nuclear threat that may exist out there at some point in the future, but I am still not convinced that our handling of foreign policy as it relates to China is the best course of action right now. We are very close to engaging them in a new Cold War atmosphere as we start the 21st century when I feel it can be ultimately avoided.

Mr. TIERNEY. Reclaiming my time just for a second, conjure up now information in the report that the administration and the Department of Defense should let us debate and talk about, about phantom trajectories, about the prospect of as the radar passes from one to a second radar, there are phantom tracks and that they are unable to control missiles shot against those phantom tracks, what is the message they send to a Russia or a China? How much time do they have to decide whether or not these are in fact something going after a phantom track or are they the launch of an offensive capacity against them? And now you understand somewhat why they feel that if you put this national missile defense on the drawing table, they already threatened that they will increase their supply of national defense missiles in the case of China or in Russia that they will not go into a program or agreement with us to de-alert those that they already have.

We should all know that is one thing the President has talked about doing that we should support is de-alerting as many on each side as we can and moving towards incapacitating them or at least having them situated where it takes a subsequent and a sufficient amount of time to have to get them activated so we can step back from the precipice and have a more reasonable policy on that.

Mr. DOGGETT. I just wanted to point out to the gentleman from Wisconsin that former Defense Secretary William Perry made much the same point that you are making within the last few months in saying that even, quote, a relatively small deployment of defensive systems could have the effect of triggering a regional nuclear arms race of considerable proportion.

As we look around the world, as you were just doing, you really cannot find any enthusiasm out there among our weak allies or among our strongest allies, some of whom we will have to count on to put these forward radar stations in their countries. None of them are coming forward and saying,

please give us this defense. It seems to be more of a political defense in this country.

Certainly there are some weapons manufacturers who see hundreds of billions of dollars of future contracts out of this. But as you search around the world, have you seen any indication of support in other parts of the world for this kind of system? I know the current Lone Star approach as carried here and somewhat misguidedly to Washington is that it no longer makes any difference what the rest of the world thinks, but what does the rest of the world think about this?

Mr. KIND. It is interesting. The President is abroad right now in Europe trying to sell at least partly on this trip the merits of his missile defense program. It was interesting to read some comments from some of the military experts within France who kind of chuckled at the thought. They are not obviously enthusiastic supporters of the program. They said, well, we kind of tried that, too, after the First World War. It was called the Maginot Line, trying to deal with a perceived threat. Obviously we saw how well that worked during the Second World War. Once the enemy saw what type of defense system was deployed, they figured out a way to get around it. That is the concern really for a lot of our allies, our European allies whom we are going to have to rely on and work with in order to bring greater stability across the globe. That I think is a very, very important issue.

I think all of us here in the House have seen the defense reviews from CIA, from the Defense Department, ranking the real threats that we face today, from the greatest threats to the least threat. Missile defense, a launch of a nuclear missile basically airmailed to us because we will know exactly where it was launched from and who sent it, is one of the least likely threats we face right now in our national security basket. More likely it would come from biological terrorism or shipping a nuclear device in a boat up the Hudson or up the Potomac River, for instance, than someone would just airmail a nuclear weapon towards us. Yet what is most troubling with the Bush administration's approach to this is they are defunding a lot of the important nonproliferation programs we have in place at the Department of Energy right now and the nuclear collaboration programs that we need to be pursuing and funding in order to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation or terrorism across the globe. Yet in the budget that they submitted, there were serious funding cutbacks in an area that we should be encouraging and investing wisely in. That I think is another serious issue.

Again, I thank my friend from Massachusetts for claiming some time this evening to talk about this very important issue. I have a feeling we have not had the last word on this subject.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. We certainly have not, I hope.

For the last word I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY).

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate my colleague from Massachusetts for putting together such an assembly of experts on the subject, including yourself, who have presented so many important facts. We have scientific expertise and budgetary expertise.

I have two reasons primarily that I oppose the national missile defense. I wish I had a poster. It would be one of Isabel Hart, age 3, and Eve Schakowsky, age 1, my granddaughters. More than anything in the whole world, I want them to be safe. If I thought that I could be part of this United States Congress to create a safety shield for these children, believe me, I would. But the more I have learned from my colleague from Massachusetts and others and reading about it and talking to the experts, I am convinced that far from creating a safety shield, that this plan actually endangers my granddaughters.

Today, a number of us participated in a press conference where Peace Action, Women's Action for New Directions, Physicians for Social Responsibility announced their plan to deliver thousands of petitions to Members of Congress from people across the country expressing opposition to Star Wars. I had visitors from the North Suburban Peace Initiative from my district who delivered that same message to my office.

I am proud and grateful that my constituents understand the risks and realities involved with President Bush's national missile defense plans. I hope that all of my colleagues had an opportunity to review the important materials that they and other committed citizens distributed on the Hill this week.

National missile defense is a program that is destined for failure on so many levels.

□ 2200

NO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, since the Reagan administration, we have been urged by wishful thinkers to deploy a system for which workable technologies does not exist, and now many years and billions and billions of dollars later the Bush administration is still pursuing what I view is an irresponsible, unnecessary and unrealistic policy.

Mr. Speaker, the fact that it does not work and we have heard experts talk about how much it does not work is actually not the most important thing to me. The most important thing is that it really should not work, because I fear that moving forward with national missile defense will actually undermine our security by igniting Cold War II and will reverse the diplomatic progress we have made over the last decade. It will make us less safe and less secure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY).

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. SCHAKOWSKY) for yielding to me.

Let me just end this hour-plus, with the courtesy of our colleague, by saying that this administration, as I started off by saying, has a ready, shoot, in-their-name approach to this whole policy. This is much like what has been going on with a number of the policies of this administration. They have unilaterally claimed that the Kyoto Protocol was dead. They have started to retract on that and are now talking about limitations on carbon dioxide and talking about cooperating with our international friends.

They have asserted that a pull-out of forces from the Balkans was imminent and now they are talking about cooperating and being sure that they do not pull out unilaterally.

They have talked about an express intent not to engage in the Middle East but reality has struck there and they have not only one envoy by two over there. They have talked about halting diplomatic initiatives in North Korea and now, in fact, they are starting to engage, or at least in all of these respects they are using semantics in talking about that. I hope they are being truthful in their attempt to move forward in that regard, although I fear that they may be just sort of smoothing and massaging what is going on while the President is abroad.

Today, their administration policies have always been leap before you think, leap before you look, whether it is domestic policy on the tax cut that cuts enormous amounts of money without deciding what we have for needs first or for obligations, and now we are talking about a national missile defense system which decidedly has not been proven to work, decidedly has not been tested and decidedly does not have tests planed to move us forward in that regard.

Now I understand that the Department of Defense is going to tell us that they are pulling back and in fact they are going to start a testing regime, with a white team and a blue team and a red team that are going to throw up countermeasures and test against them and have somebody evaluate that.

The fact of the matter is, Secretary of Defense Mr. Rumsfeld is still talking about deploying and moving forward at tremendous cost, not only financially but in terms of relationships and diplomatic relationships with other nations, even before we determine whether or not the system can work, even before we determine whether or not it fits